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Abstract 
Each year a substantial share of the European population suffers 
from major depression. This mental illness may affect individuals’ 
later life outcomes indirectly by the stigma it inflicts. The present 
study assesses hiring discrimination based on disclosed depression. 
To this end, between May 2015 and July 2015, we sent out 288 trios 
of job applications from fictitious candidates to real vacancies in 
Belgium. Within each trio, one candidate claimed to have become 
unemployed only recently, whereas the other two candidates 
revealed former depression or no reason at all for their 
unemployment during a full year. Disclosing a year of inactivity due 
to former depression decreases the probability of getting a job 
interview invitation by about 34% when compared with candidates 
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who just became unemployed, but the stigma effect of a year of 
depression is not significantly higher than the stigma effect of a year 
of unexplained unemployment. In addition, we found that these 
stigmas of depression and unemployment were driven by our male 
trios of fictitious candidates. As a consequence, our results are in 
favour of further research on gender heterogeneity in the stigma of 
depression and other health impairments. 
Keywords: Belgium; health; depression; hiring discrimination; field 
experiments. 
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1 Introduction 
According to the 2011 meta-analysis on mental health in Europe by 
Wittchen et al. (2011), each year 6.9% of the European population suffers 
from major depression. In addition to the direct impact of this mental 
illness on people’s lives, present and former depression affect individuals’ 
(later) life outcomes indirectly by the stigma depression inflicts (McGinty et 
al., 2015; Schwenk, Davis, & Wimsatt, 2010; Whitley & Campbell, 2014). A 
frequently reported consequence of depression stigma is the 
discrimination the (formerly) depressed undergo in their search for suitable 
accommodation (Corrigan, Larson, Watson, Boyle, & Barr, 2006; Whitley & 
Campbell, 2014) and/or gainful employment (Brohan, Gauci, Sartorius, & 
Thornicroft, 2011; Corrigan et al., 2006). In the present study, we focus on 
the stigma of depression in the labour market. 
Many studies have documented diminished labour market activity 
related to depression (see e.g. Frijters, Johnston, & Shields, 2010; Krause, 
2013) and the consequent economic burden for both individuals and 
society (Kessler et al., 2008). Moreover, it has been shown that being 
distanced from the labour market makes depression more persistent 
(Gebel & Vossemer, 2014; Lloyd & Waghorn, 2007; Roy & Schurer, 2013). 
Therefore, not surprisingly, the reintegration into the labour market of 
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employees inactive due to (former) depression is a key ambition of many 
OECD countries (OECD, 2013). 
The development of adequate policy responses requires the 
assessment of the hurdles (formerly) depressed individuals face when 
attempting to reintegrate into the labour market. Next to supply side 
differences in human capital and preferences (Elinson, Houck, Marcus, & 
Pincus, 2004; Ettner, Frank, & Kessler, 1997), hiring discrimination based on 
(former) depression may be one of the key hurdles facing (formerly) 
depressed individuals. As predicted theoretically by Becker (1957) and 
Arrow (1973), employers may hesitate to hire employees with mental 
problems due to a distaste (of the employers, co-workers, or customers) to 
working with them, a fear of diminished productivity, or anticipated sick 
leave problems. Yet, the stigma effect of a depression-related sick leave 
period may be dominated by the well-documented stigma effect of a non-
health-related unemployment period of comparable length (Vishwanath, 
1989).  
Some studies provide indicative empirical evidence of hiring 
discrimination based on disclosed depression (Ando et al., 2013; Brohan et 
al., 2011; Corrigan et al., 2006; Henderson, Little, Thornicroft, & Williams, 
2013; Stuart, 2006). However, because these studies are based on survey 
data, their findings may reflect perceptions of discrimination and 
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unobserved differences in human capital rather than causal evidence of 
unequal treatment. In addition, they might be biased due to reverse 
causality, i.e. due to an effect of economic attainment on mental health 
(Antonakakis & Collins, 2015; Barr, Kinderman, & Whitehead, 2015; Tøge & 
Blekesaune, 2015).  
In this study, we assess hiring discrimination based on disclosed 
depression in a direct and causal way. To this end, we send out a total of 
864 fictitious job applications to real vacancies in Belgium. These 
applications differ only in the labour market history of the candidates: one 
became unemployed (at most) a few weeks before the application, a 
second became unemployed one year earlier and does not provide the 
employer with a reason for her/his unemployment, and a third candidate 
became jobless at the same time as the second candidate but explains this 
break in employment by severe depression. By monitoring the subsequent 
reactions from the employer side, we are able to identify the effect on 
employment opportunities of disclosing a jobless year due to depression 
compared to two realistic counterfactual situations (i.e. no substantial 
break in employment and a comparable break without mentioning 
depression). 
Drawing on the mentioned literature concerning the stigma of and 
discrimination based on depression, we propose the following hypotheses: 
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H1a: Individuals with a break in employment due to depression get less 
positive callback in response to their job applications compared to similar 
candidates with no substantial break in employment.  
H1b: Individuals with a break in employment due to depression get less 
positive callback in response to their job applications compared to similar 
candidates with a comparable but unexplained break in employment.  
The empirical literature documents lower epidemiology of and more 
negative attitudes towards depression among men (Berger, Addis, Reilly, 
Syzdek, & Green, 2012; Ogrodniczuk & Oliffe, 2011; Oliffe & Philips, 2008; 
Pattyn, Verhaeghe, & Bracke, 2015; Van de Velde, Bracke, & Levecque, 
2010; Wittchen et al., 2011). In addition, other studies suggest that men 
disclosing depression may suffer more stigmatisation than their female 
peers (McCusker and Pez Galupo, 2011). We therefore proceed to inspect 
the candidate gender heterogeneity in unequal treatment due to disclosed 
depression and test the following hypothesis. 
H2: Former depression hurts hiring chances more for male candidates.  
2 The Experiment 
We set up a correspondence experiment in the spirit of Bertrand and 
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Mullainathan (2004). Within such an experiment, fictitious job applications 
are sent to real vacancies. The applications that are sent to the same 
vacancy are equivalent, except for the characteristic of interest. By 
monitoring the subsequent callback, unequal treatment based on this 
single characteristic is identified. This correspondence testing framework is 
widely viewed as providing the most convincing evidence of hiring 
discrimination (Riach & Rich, 2002). Without such experimental data, 
researchers possess considerably less data than employers. For instance, 
data on general ability and work motivation are most of the time not 
observed in survey and administrative data. By consequence, applicants 
who appear similar to researchers on the basis of standard non-
experimental data may in fact be very different in the eye of their 
prospective employers. As long as not all variables driving hiring, 
remuneration, and promotion decisions that may correlate with mental 
health are controlled by the researcher, analyses might suffer from 
selection bias. A correspondence experiment, in contrast, eliminates 
selection based on individual unobservable characteristics because the 
researcher fully controls the information available to the employer, 
allowing the researcher to disentangle discrimination from alternative 
explanations of heterogeneous hiring outcomes, such as differences in 
human capital or in employee preferences. 
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Our experiment was conducted between May 2015 and August 2015 in 
Flanders, the Dutch-speaking part of Belgium. Following the Belgian Health 
Interview Survey, gathered between 2001 and 2013, 10.1% (8.9%) of the 
population in Belgium (Flanders) suffered, at the moment of the survey, 
from symptoms of a depressive disorder (average over all age groups in, for 
each survey year, a random sample of 10,000 individuals residing in 
Belgium, regardless their place of birth, nationality or any other 
characteristic). These percentages were higher for women (12.9% in 
Belgium and 11.3% in Flanders) than for men (7.3% in Belgium and 6.6% in 
Flanders) (source: Scientific Institute of Public Health, Belgian Health 
Interview Survey). In addition, these percentages for Belgium and Flanders 
were somewhat higher than the European average presented by the 
aforementioned meta-analysis by Wittchen et al. (2011). Also following the 
European Core Health Indicators, Belgium was the country with the highest 
prevalence of depression in 2008 among 15 European countries (source: 
Eurostat, People reporting a chronic disease by disease, sex, age, and 
educational attainment level; based on national surveys using a common 
questionnaire; average over all ages). With respect to labour market 
performance, the unemployment rate in 2015 in Belgium (8.5%) and 
Flanders (5.2%) was lower than the average in the EU-27 (9.3%) (source: 
Eurostat, Unemployment rates by sex, age, and NUTS 2 regions). In 
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addition, the labour market tightness was relatively high in Belgium in 
2015: the job vacancy rate (i.e. the number of job vacancies as a 
percentage of the sum of the number of occupied posts and the number of 
job vacancies) was 2.1% in this country in the first quarter of 2015, while it 
was 1.7% in the EU-27 (source: Eurostat, Job vacancy rate). 
Three applications of unemployed candidates were sent to 288 
vacancies. From the database of the Public Employment Agency of Flanders 
— the region’s major job search channel — we randomly selected 72 
vacancies in the occupations of laboratory worker (ISCO-08 classification 
number 3111), representative (ISCO-08 3322), production worker (ISCO-08 
81), and barkeeper (ISCO-08 5131). With respect to the broad occupation 
of production worker, in particular vacancies for the sub-occupations of 
chemical products plant and machine operators (ISCO-08 8131), plastic 
products machine operators (ISCO-08 8142), food and related products 
machine operators (ISCO-08 8160), and packing, bottling, and labelling 
machine operators (ISCO-08 8183) were tested.  
These occupations were chosen for the expected variation in levels of 
skill and customer contact. In addition, the labour market tightness in 
these occupations differed. The median vacancy duration for all vacancies 
in the database of the Public Employment Agency of Flanders in 2015 was 
the highest in the occupation of barkeeper (78 days) and the lowest in the 
10 
occupation of labelling machine operator (34 days). Given that the median 
vacancy duration had a mean of about 66 days and a standard deviation of 
about 59 over all 563 occupations observed in the database of the Public 
Employment Agency of Flanders in 2015, the occupations included in our 
experiment were all characterised by rather moderate labour market 
tightness. 
We created three template types of resumes and cover letters, which 
we refer to as ‘Type A’, ‘Type B’, and ‘Type C’ applications, for each of the 
four aforementioned occupations, each matching the general requirements 
of these occupations in terms of schooling and experience. These 
application template types differed in inessential details and in layout but 
were, at the level of the occupation, identical in all job-relevant 
characteristics. To ensure that our resumes and cover letters were realistic, 
we used examples from the Public Employment Agency of Flanders as basic 
templates. 
The Type A, Type B, and Type C resumes revealed the following 
information. All applicants were born, living, and had studied in Antwerp, 
the largest city in Flanders. They were 37 or 38 years old and married. The 
candidates applying for a position as a laboratory worker (representative) 
held a bachelor’s degree in chemistry (commercial sciences). Those 
applying for the occupations of operator and barkeeper left education after 
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high school with a technical degree in tourism (Type A), commerce (Type 
B), or secretary-languages (Type C). After leaving school, all candidates had 
been working in jobs similar to the one for which they applied until April 
2014, a year before the start of our experiment. In addition, all fictitious 
individuals were unemployed at the start of our experiment, i.e. in May 
2015. Finally, all applicants revealed the following characteristics: a 
Flemish-sounding name; a birthdate in 1977 or 1978; a Belgian nationality; 
a postal address in a middle-class neighbourhood (non-existing house 
number in an existing street); a mobile phone number and an email 
address (both from major providers); adequate Dutch, French, and English 
language skills; moderate ICT skills; one practised sport; and a driving 
license. To avoid employers’ detection of the experiment, the resumes 
differed in layout, a variety of common wordings were used for the 
candidates’ (bachelor’s) degree and mentioned skills, and the candidates 
were given different sports activities (korfball, tennis, and fitness for the 
Type A, B, and C applicants, respectively). 
All cover letters mentioned that the job applicant (i) found the vacancy 
in the database of the Public Employment Agency of Flanders, (ii) was an 
experienced candidate with the right qualifications, (iii) was motivated to 
start the job, and (iv) was looking forward to a job interview. Again, to 
avoid detection of the experiment, a variety of common wordings were 
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used for the Type A, B, and C templates. The resumes and cover letters 
used are available on request. 
We sent three applications — one of Type A, Type B, and Type C — to 
each selected vacancy. For each vacancy, we randomly assigned three 
situations faced by the applicants between May 2014 and April 2015 to the 
Type A, B, and C applications. Figure 1 schematises the resulting 
trajectories of the experimental identities.  
A first (control) candidate was still employed between May 2014 and 
April 2015 in the same job as the one she/he held before May 2014. As a 
consequence, this identity was, at the moment of her/his application, 
unemployed for between less than one month (those who applied in May) 
and less than three months (those who applied in July). 
A second member of the trio was out of work between May 2014 and 
April 2015. As a consequence, this candidate’s unemployment lasted one 
year more than that of the first member of the trio. This experimental 
identity did not mention any reason for this unemployment in her/his 
cover letter. She/he mentioned in this cover letter the following: “As you 
can read in my resume, I have been unemployed during the last year. I am, 
however, very motivated to start in a new job.” As a consequence, the 
“unemployed” candidates with whom we compare the (formerly) 
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depressed candidates are actually candidates with an employment break 
which employers themselves can fill in with activities and reasons that are 
the most plausible in their perception. We come back to this point when 
discussing the limitations of this study in Section 4. 
A last member of the trio indicated former severe depression as the 
reason for her/his year out of employment between May 2014 and April 
2015. This was done by adding the clause: “In view of a trustful 
collaboration, I want to mention that during the last year I was inactive due 
to severe depression. Today, I have completely recovered and am ready for 
a new professional challenge.” 
An alternative approach would have been to just compare two recently 
unemployed candidates of which one disclosed former depression. 
However, there is no reason why job candidates would reveal former 
depression if this depression had no labour market consequences for them. 
Therefore, such an experimental setting would not have been realistic, and 
the likeliness of detection of such an experiment by employers would have 
been too high. In contrast, longer unemployment periods may be 
perceived as a signal of lower ability and work motivation if they are not 
explained (see below). As a consequence, hardly any legal explanation 
(even former depression) for longer periods without work may be 
perceived as suspect by employers. 
14 
To eliminate any application type effects on callbacks, we alternately 
assigned the mentioned experimental identities to the Type A, Type B, and 
Type C applications. As a consequence of this random assignment, there 
was no correlation between experimental identity and application 
template type so that the aforementioned minimal differences between 
Type A, B, and C application templates could not bias our results.  
To inspect the candidate gender heterogeneity in unequal treatment 
due to disclosed depression, we also alternated the gender of the three 
candidates between the trios. More concretely, to the odd vacancies we 
sent a trio of female candidates, whereas to the even vacancies we sent a 
trio of male candidates. 
The resulting combinations were sent to the employers between 18 
May 2015 and 11 July 2015, in an alternating order, each time with 
approximately 24 hours in between the trio members. Callbacks were 
received by telephone voicemail or email. In our analysis, we follow Baert 
et al. (2015) in distinguishing between two definitions of positive callback. 
Positive callback sensu stricto means the applicant was invited for an 
interview concerning the job for which she/he applied. Positive callback 
sensu lato also includes the request to contact the recruiter by telephone 
or to provide more information by email or the proposal of an alternative 
job. All callbacks received later than 30 days after sending out the 
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application were ignored. 
Between November 2013 and March 2014 we ran a pilot experiment in 
which only two applications were sent to 152 Flemish vacancies. These 
vacancies were unbalanced over the four occupations included in the final 
experiment. In this pilot, the experimental identity without a substantial 
break in employment was not included. However, with respect to the 
comparison of the identities included in this pilot experiment, the findings 
were very similar to those based on the experiment on which we report in 
the present study. 
This research was reviewed and approved by the Ethical Committee of 
the Faculty of Economics and Business Administration of Ghent University 
at its meeting of 9 July 2013. The report of this meeting (in Dutch) is 
available on request. 
3 Results 
Table 1 describes the experimentally gathered data. In general, for 65 (115) 
vacancies, at least one of our three fictitious job applicants received a 
positive callback in strict (broad) sense. In 14 (49) of these vacancies, each 
of the three candidates received a positive callback. Next, in 19 (19), 14 (8), 
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and 4 (7) of the situations, only the recently unemployed, long-term 
unemployed, and depressed identities, respectively, received a positive 
callback. Finally, in 5 (14) of the vacancies, there was positive callback 
sensu stricto (sensu lato) for only the recently unemployed and the long-
term unemployed, in 3 (10) vacancies only for the recently unemployed 
and the depressed, and in 6 (8) vacancies only for the long-term 
unemployed and the depressed candidate. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE. 
Based on these statistics, we can calculate the positive callback rates, 
i.e. the average probability of receiving a positive response, for our 
experimental identities. These rates are presented in column (2), column 
(3), and column (4) of Table 2. Panels A and C provide these statistics at the 
level of the total dataset. Overall, the recently unemployed candidate got a 
positive callback sensu stricto (sensu lato) in 14.2% (31.9%) of her/his 
applications. Her/his counterparts with a substantial employment break 
got a positive reaction in 10.1% (27.1%) of the cases when mentioning no 
reason for unemployment and in 9.4% (25.7%) of the cases when revealing 
former depression. 
These rates suggest a preference for the recently unemployed over 
17 
both the long-term unemployed and (formerly) depressed identities. 
However, we cannot assess the significance of their differences in callback 
chances based on these statistics. Therefore, we follow the literature by 
calculating two measures comparing callback outcomes identity-by-
identity: the positive callback ratio, as outlined in the last three columns of 
Table 2, and the net discrimination rate, as presented in Table 3 (Baert et 
al., 2015, 2016; Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004; McGinnity & Lunn, 2011; 
Riach & Rich, 2002). 
The positive callback ratio is calculated by dividing the positive callback 
rate for a first group of candidates by the corresponding positive callback 
rate for a second group of candidates. Panel A and panel C of column (6) in 
Table 2 show that the probability of getting a positive callback is 
substantially higher for candidates without an employment break 
compared to candidates mentioning a year of depression. The positive 
callback ratio sensu stricto (sensu lato) is 1.519 (1.243) when comparing 
these experimental identities. This means that the former candidates 
receive 51.9% (24.3%) more job interview invitations (positive reactions in 
broad sense) than the latter candidates. In other words, the probability of 
getting invited to a job interview decreases by 34.2% (i.e. 1 – [1/1.519]) 
and the probability of any positive reaction decreases by 19.5% for 
candidates revealing a recent year out of work due to depression instead of 
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a year of employment. Next to being substantial in magnitude, these ratios 
are also statistically significant at the 5% (1%) significance level. Thus, in 
line with our research hypothesis H1a, employers penalise job candidates 
for a recent career break due to depression ceteris paribus. 
However, panel A and panel C of column (5) show that an employment 
break of comparable length, but without mentioning any reason, is subject 
to a similar penalisation. The latter result is in line with the literature 
indicating a negative relationship between (unexplained) unemployment 
duration and hiring chances (Eriksson & Rooth, 2014; Kroft, Lange, & 
Notowidigdo, 2013). In addition, this finding is complementary to the more 
general finding of “state dependence” in individual unemployment (or 
“unemployment scarring”), i.e. the pattern that individuals who are 
unemployed in the present are more likely to be unemployed in the future 
ceteris paribus (Arulampalam, Gregg, & Gregory, 2001; Cockx & Picchio, 
2012; Daly & Delaney, 2013; Heckman & Borjas, 1980; Mooi-Reci & 
Ganzeboom, 2015). In particular, our result is related to (and empirically 
supports) one of the major explanations for state dependence in 
employment besides human capital depreciation and loss of self-esteem, 
i.e. unemployment as a signal of lower ability and motivation to employers.  
Column (7) presents the positive callback ratios with respect to the 
comparison of the two experimental identities with a substantial 
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employment break. It is found that the probability of positive callback 
sensu stricto (sensu lato) is 7.4% (6.8%) higher when not mentioning any 
reason for being out of work than when mentioning depression as a 
reason. However, these differences in positive callback are not statistically 
significant. So, we cannot reject that the stigma effect of a year of 
(inactivity due to) depression is equal in magnitude to the stigma effect of 
a year of unexplained unemployment. In other words, we do not find 
evidence for H1b. 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE. 
Next, we inspect the heterogeneity in unequal treatment by the gender 
of the candidate (based on panels B and D of Table 2). When splitting the 
data by the gender of the trios of candidates, significant measures of 
unequal treatment are only found for the subsample of male candidates. 
Male candidates without a break in employment are preferred above male 
candidates with such a break due to former depression. However, the 
same is true when comparing male candidates without a break and male 
candidates with a break due to (unexplained) unemployment. In other 
words, our general findings of comparable stigmas of a year of inactivity 
due to depression and a year of unemployment are driven by the male 
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rather than the female trios. We come back to the significance of this 
dimension of heterogeneity in unequal treatment below. 
The net discrimination rate comparing the callback for two 
experimental identities is calculated in two steps. First, we reduce the 
number of applications for which the first identity (e.g. the recently 
unemployed) received a positive callback and the second identity (e.g. the 
long-term unemployed) received none by the number of applications for 
which the reverse was true. Second, we divide the result of this calculation 
by the number of application pairs for which at least one of these two 
identities got a positive callback. So, in line with Baert et al. (2015), 
McGinnity and Lunn (2011), and Riach and Rich (2002), when, for a 
particular comparison, neither of the identities received a positive callback, 
we treat this as a non-observation in this analysis at the vacancy level. The 
final result is a net measure of the number of unfavourable unequal 
treatment acts that the latter applicant could expect to encounter per 
application for which at least one of the two identities under investigation 
received a positive callback. At the level of the total dataset, the net 
discrimination rates presented in Table 3 (panels A and C) lead to exactly 
the same conclusions as the aforementioned positive callback ratios. The 
net discrimination rates indicate a preference for the recently unemployed 
over both identities with a year out of work (with depression as the reason 
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or no explanation at all). Also, the net discrimination rates by candidate 
gender (panels B and D of Table 3) lead to the same conclusions as those 
based on the aforementioned positive callback ratios. 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE. 
As the candidates’ situations between May 2014 and April 2015 
(employment, unemployment, or inactivity due to depression) were 
assigned randomly within our trios of applications, regressing positive 
callback (sensu stricto or sensu lato) on an indicator of these situations 
yields exactly the same conclusion as the one based on panels A and C of 
Table 2. In addition, as we randomly assigned the candidates’ gender 
between trios, regressions including interactions between the candidates’ 
treatment status and their gender should lead to the same empirical 
pattern as the one in panel B and panel D of Table 2, at least for a sample 
size approaching infinity. However, our sample size is finite. Thus, the 
gender of the trios might correlate with (un)observable vacancy 
characteristics. As these characteristics may affect the hiring outcomes of 
our candidate pairs, not controlling for them could yield biased measures 
of the heterogeneity of discrimination based on former depression by the 
candidates’ gender. Therefore, in line with recent correspondence 
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experiments (Baert et al., 2015, 2016; Drydakis, In press), we further 
explore the experimental data by a regression analysis including vacancy 
fixed effects. Another reason for conducting a regression analysis is that it 
allows us to investigate the heterogeneity of discrimination against 
formerly depressed job candidates by other dimensions of observed 
variation in the experimentally gathered data, i.e. variation in the 
occupation and contract type mentioned in the vacancy. 
More specifically, we regress positive callback on (i) having been out of 
employment between May 2014 and April 2015, (ii) having been out of 
employment during this period due to (disclosed) depression, and (iii) 
various sets of variables interacted with (i) and (ii). The results of these 
regressions are presented in Table 4. In models (1) to (3) we adopt the 
sensu stricto definition of the dependent variable; in models (4) to (6) the 
sensu lato definition. In all regressions we control for vacancy fixed effects 
such that any impact of vacancy characteristics (without interaction with (i) 
and (ii)) is controlled. Random effect estimations yield equivalent results.  
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE. 
In regression models (1) and (4), we only include the indicators of 
having been a year out of work and disclosing former depression as the 
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reason for this break. By doing that, we find that a year out of employment 
decreases the probability of a job interview invitation (the probability of 
any positive reaction) by 4.5 (5.4) percentage points. These outcomes 
equal the differences between the overall positive callback rates sensu 
stricto (sensu lato) for the experimental identities discussed above based 
on panel A (panel C) of Table 2. For instance: -0.045 = (0.101 + 0.094)/2 - 
0.142. In addition, disclosing depression as the reason for the one-year 
break has, compared with giving no reason other than unemployment, no 
significant effect on the probability of positive callback. 
Secondly, in models (2) and (5), we include interactions between the 
treatment indicators adopted in models (1) and (4) and the gender of the 
candidate. In line with our discussion of panel B and panel D of Table 2, we 
find that male candidates are punished more for a jobless year than female 
candidates, irrespective of whether depression is the reason for this break 
in employment or not. In other words, we find a higher stigma of both 
former depression and unemployment for male candidates compared with 
female candidates. The higher stigma of depression for males is in line with 
the empirical evidence reviewed in the introduction (and, therefore, with 
our research hypothesis H2). The higher stigma of unemployment among 
them may be partly due to the fact that it is more common for women to 
have a period of inactivity around the age of 35 because of child-rearing 
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activities (OECD, 2011). Consequently, as suggested by an anonymous 
reviewer of a former version of the present study, our findings may also 
have a cultural explanation. In addition, the general finding of less unequal 
treatment based on (former) depression and unemployment against 
female candidates might be explained by the lower overall number of 
applications from women for the tested occupations. Indeed, the fraction 
of women among the unemployed who indicated in 2015 to be interested 
in the occupations of representative, operator, and barkeeper in the 
database of the Public Employment Agency of Flanders was only about 
32%, 26%, and 29%, respectively (for the occupation of laboratory worker, 
this was about 51%). Therefore, employers who pursued a gender balance 
in their firm might have been less picky with respect to female candidates 
for these occupations ceteris paribus. 
Lastly, in models (3) and (6), we include additional interactions with 
indicators for jobs as a representative, jobs as a production worker, jobs as 
a barkeeper, vacancies offering temporary contracts, and vacancies 
offering part-time contracts. The effect of having been a year out of work 
and disclosing former depression as the reason for this break is somewhat 
less adverse for the occupations of representative, production worker, and 
barkeeper compared to the occupation of laboratory worker. Given that, as 
mentioned in Section 2, labour market tightness was the highest in the 
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latter occupation, this finding contrasts to some extent to what Baert et al. 
(2015) found, i.e. that ethnic discrimination is lower in Flanders in 
occupations where labour market tightness is higher. However, none of the 
interactions added in models (3) and (6) have a statistically significant 
effect (at the 5% level) on the probability of positive callback.  
4 Discussion 
We investigated hiring discrimination based on former depression in a 
direct, empirical way. In contrast to former contributions on labour market 
discrimination against (formerly) depressed employees, we did not use 
survey data but gathered unique field experimental data. Thereby, we 
made sure that our results were not biased by inverse causality and did not 
reflect perceptions of discrimination and unobserved differences in human 
capital rather than causal evidence of unequal treatment. More concretely, 
we sent out trios of fictitious job applications to real vacancies in Belgium. 
We randomly assigned the treatment of a break in employment due to 
depression and two relevant counterfactual situations, i.e. no substantial 
break in employment and a comparable break without mentioning 
depression, within these trios. In addition, we alternated between male 
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and female trios. This enabled us to contribute further to the literature by 
inspecting whether unequal treatment based on disclosed depression (and 
unexplained unemployment) was heterogeneous by candidates’ gender. 
We showed that, in the tested vacancies in the Belgian labour market, 
the probability of getting invited to a job interview decreased by about one 
third, and the probability of getting any positive reaction decreased by 
about one fifth for candidates revealing a recent year out of work due to 
depression (compared to the situation of no substantial employment 
break). In that respect, our study shows that the stigma of depression, as 
amply documented in the literature, causes discrimination in the labour 
market, at least in Belgium. However, the penalisation for disclosing 
inactivity due to former depression is not more severe than the 
penalisation for an unexplained unemployment period of comparable 
length. In addition, we found that these comparable stigmas of a year of 
inactivity due to depression and a year of unemployment were driven by 
the male rather than the female trios we sent out. As a consequence, our 
results are in favour of focusing further on gender heterogeneity in the 
stigma of depression and, by extension, the stigma of other health 
impairments. 
We acknowledge four research limitations inherent to our experimental 
design. First, we gave no alternative explicit explanation for the 
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unemployment of the experimental identity who did not mention (former) 
depression as a reason for her/his long-term unemployment. As a 
consequence, the “unemployed” applicant in our experiment could also be 
a formerly depressed applicant not disclosing her/his health problems. 
Stated otherwise, we did not observe the assumptions employers made 
about the health or other stigma conditions concerning the latter 
applicant. As mentioned in Section 2, the “depressed” candidates we 
compared to “unemployed” candidates in our framework were, therefore, 
actually “openly depressed” and the “unemployed” candidates were 
actually candidates with an employment break that employers themselves 
could fill in with activities and reasons that were the most plausible in their 
perception. As a result, we compared the costs associated with disclosing 
former depression to the costs associated with leaving employers 
uninformed about reasons for lack of employment. We believe that this is a 
relevant trade-off faced by formerly depressed job candidates in reality. In 
addition, when comparing the callback for the candidate without a 
substantial employment break and the (formerly) depressed candidate, we 
could not decompose the penalty for the latter candidate in a part inherent 
to her/his additional year outside the labour market and a part inherent to 
her/his depression. Nevertheless, we believe comparing the callback for 
these candidates is relevant, because also in real life, candidates who only 
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differ in former depression status and thereby in the length of their non-
employment spell have to compete. 
A second limitation of this article is its focus on a particular labour 
market outcome, i.e. employers’ first hiring decisions. We only measured 
differences in their callbacks so that our findings cannot be translated into 
divergences in final job offers, wages, or promotion opportunities. So, in 
comparison with former contributions to the literature on discrimination 
based on depression, we benefited from a research design guaranteeing 
causal discrimination measures at the cost of giving up on scope. However, 
Bendick, Brown, and Wall (1999), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), and 
Cédiey, Foroni, and Garner (2008) show that (i) reduced interview rates 
translate into reduced final job offers, wages, and promotion opportunities 
and that (ii) if discrimination occurs, it does so especially in the first phase 
of the hiring process. 
Thirdly, we only measured the discrimination against (formerly) 
depressed (and long-term unemployed) candidates within jobs in the four 
tested occupations submitted to the database of the Public Employment 
Agency of Flanders. Although this limitation is less acute in our design 
compared to many former studies focusing on only one occupation (Riach 
& Rich, 2002), it is still possible that the stigma of depression (or 
unexplained unemployment) is more or less present in other occupations 
29 
than those covered. For instance, in line with Baert et al. (2015), 
discrimination based on former depression could be expected to be lower 
(higher) in occupations with very high (low) labour market tightness. 
However, this limitation, if important, should cause a similar shift in the 
penalty for depression (and unemployment) for males and females. As a 
consequence, this finding should not bias our conclusions with respect to 
the heterogeneity in unequal treatment by the gender of the candidate. 
The same is true for the aforementioned limitations. 
A final limitation has further repercussions for the generalisability of 
our findings. In this study, unequal treatment based on former depression 
and unemployment was measured for married people aged 37 or 38. As 
both treatments might have a different effect (as such and by gender) for 
different candidate characteristics, our results cannot be easily generalised 
to other age groups and people with a different civil status. 
We end this article with two policy reflections. Firstly, in many OECD 
countries, a legal framework to punish labour market discrimination is 
available (Bassanini & Saint-Martin, 2008), so that in view of reducing 
discrimination against (formerly) depressed candidates, the main benefit 
seems to lie in a more vigorous detection of it. To implement this, one 
could consider a (systematic) application of the experimentation 
framework used in this study. Second, from an individual job candidate’s 
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perspective, our results do not yield a superior strategy with respect to 
(not) mentioning former depression as the reason for an employment 
break. However, they indicate that, compared to females, males have a 
greater interest in avoiding employment breaks, irrespective of whether 
they are related to health or other reasons. 
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Figure 1: Experimental Identities. 
 
39 
Table 1: The Probability of Positive Callback: Descriptive Statistics. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Observations Jobs 
None of the three 
candidates positive 
callback 
Each of the three 
candidates positive 
callback 
Only candidate 
mentioning year of 
employment 
positive callback 
Only candidate 
mentioning year of 
unemployment 
positive callback 
Only candidate 
mentioning year of 
depression positive 
callback 
Only candidate 
mentioning year of 
employment and 
candidate 
mentioning year of 
unemployment 
positive callback 
Only candidate 
mentioning year of 
employment and 
candidate 
mentioning year of 
depression positive 
callback 
Only candidate 
mentioning year of 
unemployment and 
candidate mentioning 
year of depression 
positive callback 
A. Positive callback sensu stricto: All observations   
All 288 233 14 19 4 4 5 3 6 
B. Positive callback sensu stricto: Heterogeneity by gender of the candidate 
Males 144 113 9 13 1 3 3 1 1 
Females 144 120 5 6 3 1 2 2 5 
C. Positive callback sensu lato: All observations   
All 288 173 49 19 8 7 14 10 8 
D. Positive callback sensu lato: Heterogeneity by gender of the candidate 
Males 144 84 27 13 1 3 8 5 3 
Females 144 89 22 6 7 4 6 5 5 
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Table 2: The Probability of Positive Callback: Positive Callback Rates and Positive Callback Ratios. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Observations Jobs 
Positive callback rate 
candidate mentioning 
year of employment 
Positive callback rate 
candidate mentioning 
year of unemployment 
Positive callback rate 
candidate mentioning 
year of depression 
PCR employed versus 
unemployed: (2)/(3) 
PCR employed versus 
depressed: (2)/(4) 
PCR unemployed versus 
depressed: (3)/(4) 
A. Positive callback sensu stricto: All observations 
All 288 0.142 0.101 0.094 1.414** [2.133] 1.519** [2.419] 1.074 [0.499] 
B. Positive callback sensu stricto: Heterogeneity by gender of the candidate 
Males 144 0.181 0.097 0.097 1.857*** [3.082] 1.857*** [2.739] 1.000 [0.000] 
Females 144 0.104 0.104 0.090 1.000 [0.000] 1.154 [0.532] 1.154 [0.705] 
C. Positive callback sensu lato: All observations 
All 288 0.319 0.274 0.257 1.165* [1.946] 1.243*** [2.622] 1.068 [0.799] 
D. Positive callback sensu lato: Heterogeneity by gender of the candidate 
Males 144 0.368 0.271 0.264 1.359*** [3.066] 1.395*** [2.959] 1.026 [0.810] 
Females 144 0.271 0.278 0.250 0.975 [0.836] 1.083 [0.652] 1.111 [0.851] 
Notes. The positive callback ratio (PCR) is calculated by dividing the positive callback rate for a first group of candidates by the corresponding positive callback rate for a second group of candidates. T-
statistics, indicating whether the ratios are significantly different from 1 and based on standard errors corrected for clustering at the vacancy level, are between brackets. *** (**) ((*)) indicate significance 
at the 1% (5%) ((10%)) significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 3: The Probability of Positive Callback: Net Discrimination Rates. 
 (1) (2) (3) (3) 
Observations Jobs NDR employed versus unemployed NDR employed versus depressed NDR unemployed versus depressed 
A. Positive callback sensu stricto: All observations 
All 288 0.235** [4.500] 0.275** [5.765] 0.056 [0.250] 
B. Positive callback sensu stricto: Heterogeneity by gender of the candidate 
Males 144 0.429*** [9.000] 0.400*** [7.200] 0.000 [0.000] 
Females 144 0.000 [0.000] 0.095 [0.286] 0.111 [0.500] 
C. Positive callback sensu lato: All observations 
All 288 0.120* [3.756] 0.168*** [6.750] 0.052 [0.641] 
D. Positive callback sensu lato: Heterogeneity by gender of the candidate 
Males 144 0.246*** [8.909] 0.254*** [8.333] 0.021 [0.059] 
Females 144 -0.020 [0.043] 0.063 [0.429] 0.082 [0.727] 
Notes. The net discrimination rate (NDR) is calculated by reducing the number of applications for which the former candidate was preferred by the number of applications for which the latter candidate 
was preferred, and this difference is then divided by the number of application pairs in which at least one received a positive callback. The chi-square test for the net discrimination rate tests the null 
hypothesis that both candidates are treated unfavourably with the same frequency. χ²-statistics are between brackets. *** (**) ((*)) indicate significance at the 1% (5%) ((10%)) significance levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 4: The Probability of Positive Callback: Linear Probability Model Regression Estimates. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Year out of work  -0.045** (0.019) -0.045** (0.018) -0.045** (0.018) -0.054** (0.021) -0.054*** (0.021) -0.054*** (0.021) 
Year out of work x Depression as reason (normalised) -0.007 (0.014) -0.007 (0.014) -0.007 (0.014) -0.017 (0.022) -0.017 (0.022) -0.017 (0.022) 
Year out of work x Female candidate (normalised)  0.083** (0.039) 0.086** (0.039)  0.104** (0.046) 0.099** (0.046) 
Year out of work x Depression as reason x Female candidate (normalised)  -0.014 (0.028) -0.014 (0.029)  -0.021 (0.043) -0.021 (0.042) 
Year out of work x Representative (normalised)   0.015 (0.058)   0.023 (0.065) 
Year out of work x Depression as reason x Representative (normalised)   0.042 (0.042)   0.028 (0.063) 
Year out of work x Production worker (normalised)   0.029 (0.048)   0.014 (0.063) 
Year out of work x Depression as reason x Production worker (normalised)   0.013 (0.037)   -0.015 (0.061) 
Year out of work x Barkeeper (normalised)   0.046 (0.070)   0.062 (0.084) 
Year out of work x Depression as reason x Barkeeper (normalised)   0.069 (0.052)   0.109* (0.065) 
Year out of work x Temporary contract (normalised)   0.027 (0.064)   -0.116 (0.085) 
Year out of work x Depression as reason x Temporary contract (normalised)   0.002 (0.053)   0.005 (0.085) 
Year out of work x Part-time contract (normalised)   -0.071 (0.077)   -0.132 (0.089) 
Year out of work x Depression as reason x Part-time contract (normalised)   0.032 (0.051)   0.064 (0.073) 
Constant 0.142*** (0.012) 0.142*** (0.012) 0.142*** (0.012) 0.319*** (0.014) 0.319*** (0.014) 0.311*** (0.014) 
Dependent variable: invitation to a job interview Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Dependent variable: any positive reaction No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Vacancy fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 864 864 864 864 864 864 
Notes. Except for the variable ‘Year out of work’, all independent variables are normalised. The triple interactions are normalised by subtracting their mean among the subpopulation of formerly depressed 
candidates. The other variables are normalised by subtracting their mean among the subpopulation of candidates who were a year out of employment. Standard errors, corrected for clustering of the 
observations at the vacancy level, are in parentheses. *** (**) ((*)) indicate significance at the 1% (5%) ((10%)) levels, respectively.  
 
